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Heidegger's attempt to overcome metaphysics has created as much 
confusion as it has inspired the development of deconslructionist strategies 
in the second half of the 20th century. By interweaving five elegantly 
crafted essays, Dominique Janicaud and Jean-Francois Mattel trace the 
subtlest shifts within language by which Heidegger "steps back" from the 
sedimentations of conventional metaphysical usage and retrieves the most 
perennial of all issues, the question of being. Rather than renouncing the 
project of fundamental ontology due to its various aporias, the authors elicit 
new channels of discovery within Heidegger's writings so as to mark other 
paths to the matter of thought. In a self-styled duel, they amplify the 
tension between Heidegger's approach to language and that of metaphysics. 
These divergences, which become most explicit in the "Letter on 
Humanism" (1947), harbor more radical forms of articulation which enable 
us to think what remains unthought throughout Western philosophy. 
The emphasis on a "duet" proves especially telling. For to appreciate 
the work as a whole we must be able to distinguish the contribution of each 
author. Indeed, the book cannot be quoted piecemeal; for in forging a 
unique path, the authors implement a key motif of Heidegger's pot-
metaphysical thought, namely, that thinking is a solitary journey which each 
individual undertakes in his/her ownmost way. In the first two chapters, 
Dominique Janicaud illustrates how the overcoming of metaphysics 
involves recalling its limits, that is, appropriating the possibilities which 
have been incubated within the tradition from the beginning. "Thus, 
metaphysics is less overcome than assigned to limits, it is less set aside than 
reminisced about in its truth" (p. 7). By addressing Heidegger's essay 
"Overcoming Metaphysics" (1954), Janicaud shows how thinking is a 
worldly enterprise which endures the tension between the dominance of 
technological rationality and the humility of dwelling in harmony with the 
poetic intimations of language (p. 39). 
In the third and longest chapter, Jean-Francois Mattel takes a bold step 
to consider the unique configuration between thought and language—the 
development of nuance and differentiation—which evokes new depths of 
meaning otherwise hidden in the most familiar ontological concepts. He 
thereby counters the popular tendency to label the later Heidegger as a 
mystic who abandons his earlier effort to elicit a matrix of articulation to 
express the most obscure facets of being. Mall6i describes this opening 
forth of a space of articulation as a "selling apart" or "chiasmus." He has in 
view transposing familiar connotations assigned to concepts, or relocating 
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the boundaries of speech so as to cultivate new combinations of meaning. 
"I shall call 'chiasmus' the figure of the reversal of a proposition whose 
members are contained within both the initial proposition whose members 
are contained within both the initial proposition and the inverted one and 
produce a distinctive pattern of crossed overlapping" (p. 41). In a 
provocative and graphic manner, Mattel indicates why ontological language 
becomes so much an issue of style for Heidegger, and how thought exacts a 
greater measure of rigor by incorporating the limits which are implied by its 
relation to poetry. 
Mattel's appeal to "crossed articulations" cuts to the quick of 
Heidegger's controversial attempt to write the word "being" with the letter 
"X" across it as exemplified in The Question of Being [1957] (p. 41). 
Rather than entailing a deconstructionist obsfucation of writing under 
erasure, this practice of "crossing out" unlocks the meanings already 
harbored in the niches of language, and restores to words an elasticity of 
setting apart and gathering together diverse connotations. For example, in 
What is a Thing?, Heidegger transposes the significance of Kant's highest 
principle of synthetic judgments to outline the intermediary zone of the 
"between" (Zwischen) where the cognitive relation as a whole unfolds. 
" . . . the conclusion on the Kantian doctrine in What is a Thing?, (1935-36) 
allows one to detect the openness of another dimension, between things and 
humans, 'which reaches out beyond things and back behind human beings'" 
(p. 64). 
Through his concise discussion of chiasmus, Mattel reinterprets the turn 
(Kehre) as a curvature and transformation at the heart of thinking rather 
than as a linear shift from the early to the latter Heidegger. 
For the turn to be truly a turn that maintains its grip, it 
must cause the thing it moves to turn and spin so as to 
transform its uniform rectilinear movement into circular 
motion. It needs to amount to a circuit. The turn, is, after 
all, turning motion. We must perhaps think of the turn as 
the principle of the cycles regulating the universe (pp. 76-
77). 
Mattel suggests that the torsion created by the turn allocates the space for 
the interaction between world and thing, thereby inaugurating a historical-
cosmic event which Heidegger describes as the play of the "fourfold" 
(Geviert)—earth, sky, mortals and gods. The playful configuration of the 
fourfold reveals the intersecting axes of thought and language. "By thus 
following the crossed intertwining of the four wc have gradually entered the 
round of the Geviert, where again we encounter the ring . . . that endlessly 
comes back upon itself, yet never closes and is freed in its coiling motion" 
(p. 109). In this chiasmatic turning, the conventional coordinates of up and 
down, of transcendent and immanent, are interchanged. Thus, the 
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luminosily of (he divine realm, or (he stars sparkles against the backdrop of 
our earth-boundcdness, the darkness of the night (pp. 149-159). 
In Chapter Four, Janicaud addresses the enigma posed by the historical 
epochs of being, that is, its character as destiny on the one hand and the 
human contribution of decision on the other. With great subtlety he marks 
the interface between the transmission of ontological history and the crisis 
of technology. "Now, the knot of the topic of 'decision' has precisely 
already been cut by Heidegger in a sense that gives rise to a difficulty, for it 
presupposes that one can be on both sides of the 'decision' at the same time" 
(p. 161). In Chapter Five, Janicaud initiates a dialogue between diverse 
participants in order to nurture the asymmetries of Heidegger's thought 
which permit its recoil within the wider expanse of openness rather than 
seeking its closure as a monolithic system. The Epilogue offers a brief 
dialogue between authors which marks both the divergence and intersection 
of their distinct pathways of thought (p. 226). 
Any attempt to accentuate the character of though remains abstract, 
however, without also considering the dispositional ingredient which orients 
all ontological inquiry. Whether we consider the circuit of disclosedness 
which springs from hermeneutics, or thought's response to the issuance of 
being's truth (Ereignis), a preliminary attunement (Stimmung) must still 
intervene in order to restore a sense of originality to the philosophical 
endeavor. Indeed, the preliminary claim offinitude re-emerges to anticipate 
the further of thought to its mode of attunement marks the experiential 
condition by which anyone aspiring to be a philosopher can begin from the 
concrete stance of his/her thrownness into language. If there is a point on 
which both Janicaud and Mattel concur, it is on the need for thought to 
experience its primeval rootcdness in a way otherwise lucking in Hegel's 
speculative philosophy of the Absolute. 
Professors Janicaud and Mattdi provide a bold entree into the labyrinth 
of Heidegger's later philosophy with a tenacity seldom witnessed in 
contemporary scholarship. Though limited it its scope, their work is as 
rewarding in its bursts of insights as it is challenging in the patience 
required to read it. Indeed, the authors leave the reader desiring more, and 
while this may be a shortcoming when viewed from one perspective, it is a 
virtue when seen from another. 
